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For we built so well so long.., still, when I look at the road we're
traveling on . . . I wonder what's gone wrong . . . can't help but
wonder what's gone wrong.
- Simon and Garfunkel1
I. INTRODUCTION
Eight hundred years ago, political institutions and intellectual insti-
tutions in Western Europe began parallel evolutionary quests to foster
Freedom, Justice, and Equality. Eight hundred years later, the legal
institutions of the U.S. have yet to craft a doctrine to protect the uni-
versities in their continuing quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality.
This paper chronicles that sad tale.
t A version of this paper was presented at an international conference under the
title "Academic Freedom Under Seige: Is there a Doctrinal Counterpoise to Check
the Religious Right's Attempt to Foreclose Open Discourse in the University" at
"Too Pure on Air: Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality" at the
Gloucester Conference on June 19, 2006. 2006 Gloucester Conference, http://www.
gloucesterconference.com/program6-19.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
(Spring 2007); Professor of Law and Executive Director, Nonprofit Law Center, Uni-
versity of Tulsa College of Law. I am indebted to participants at the Gloucestershire
University Conference for their thoughtful comments and illuminating insights about
an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful for the financial support provided
by a University of Tulsa summer grant which sustained this research project.
1. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, America, on Simon & Garfunkel, The Concert in Cen-
tral Park (Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 1982). 311
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Freedom, Justice, and Equality-keystone principles in western de-
liberative democracies-have both supported and been nurtured by
systems of free inquiry developed within the great universities of Eu-
rope. Indeed, the parallel evolution of these intellectual institutions
and their political or legal counterparts was initiated by path- break-
ing events in the High Middle Ages2 and especially during the Thir-
teenth Century. In England, two notable changes were wrought in the
institutions of government, which were foundational in initiating an
evolutionary political process toward institutionalized guarantees of
Freedom, Justice, and Equality. First, the Magna Carta, signed by
King John in 1215, established the principles of limited sovereignty,
the primacy of law over monarchy, and the guarantee of judicial pro-
cess.3 While each of the 63 clauses of the Magna Carta limits the sov-
ereignty of the monarch in some way, of particular importance for the
subject-matter of this conference is Article 39, which states: "No free
man shall be arrested, or imprisoned, or deprived of his property, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor shall we go against
him or send against him, unless by legal judgment of his peers, or by
the law of the land."4
The second major liberalizing change in English political instruc-
tions that occurred in the Thirteenth century was the enactment of the
Provisions of Oxford against the monarchy in 1258,' which imposed
upon the King the legal necessity of conferring with representatives of
the nobility and townspeople through Councils. The Provisions of
Oxford reconstituted the Councils (formerly called at the King's dis-
cretion) into a formally institutionalized Parliament, charged with the
responsibility of reviewing the King's policies. They mandated that
the King act in consultation with the Parliament only. Thus, the
Magna Carta opened the door to constitutional protections of individ-
ual rights while the Provisions of Oxford set the stage for representa-
tional government. In tandem with these foundational changes in
political institutions and limitations on political power that occurred
during the Thirteenth Century, innovations in both intellectual
method and intellectual institutions also emerged.
2. Roughly, the period between the years 950 and 1350 C.E. witnessed a robust
population growth (fueled by favorable weather conditions and advances in technol-
ogy that provided an adequate agricultural base to sustain the increase in population)
and a revival of urban life and trade that had largely disappeared during the early
Middle Ages. See generally ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF
THE MIDDLE AGES, 950-1350, at 27-34 (1976) (analyzing the cultural climate of the
middle ages).
3. See generally J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1992) (giving an in-depth
analysis of the Magna Carta along with its history and effect).
4. Id. at 461.
5. See generally ROBERT BARTLETT, ENGLAND UNDER THE NORMAN AND AN-
GEVIN KINGS: 1075-1225 (2000) (giving an overview of English society from
1075-1225). 312
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The Thirteenth century witnessed the introduction of the institu-
tionalization of higher learning, research, and scholarship in the form
of universities. The first two universities were established in Bologna
and Paris6 at the beginning of the Thirteenth century; and by the end
of that century, the institution of the university had spread throughout
Western Europe. Different in many respects from their modern coun-
terparts, medieval universities did afford the intellectual community a
locus of power and organization. It also established the rudiments of
a system of degrees, departments, and colleges.'
At about the same time, radical changes were taking place with re-
gard to intellectual method, scope, and perspective. Monasticism, a
theory of study and scholarship that was predominantly passive and
rote,8 was challenged and gradually supplanted by scholasticism.'
And while scholasticism was a step toward free inquiry and the empir-
ical methods of research and analysis we enjoy today,1" it was elemen-
tary. Scholasticism changed the scope and method of intellectual
endeavor by reaching beyond Biblical and Church-generated texts to
secular, even non-Christian texts1 and by engaging the texts in a
6. See STEPHEN C. FERRUOLO, THE ORIGINS OF THE UNIVERSITY: THE SCHOOLS
OF PARIS AND THEIR CRITICS, 1100-1215, at 5 (1985).
7. See ALAN B. COBBAN, ENGLISH UNIVERSITY LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 4-5
(1999). Before the institutionalization of higher learning by universities, teachers
opened their own separate schools or colleges. Monasteries and urban Cathedrals
also ran institutions of higher learning. See id.
8. Under the strictures of monasticism (most famously, The Rule of Saint Bene-
dict), monks (and, later, students within monastic universities) were directed to accept
the texts of the Bible and of church-designated authors (Church "Fathers") without
questioning them. See JOHN W. BALDWIN, THE SCHOLASTIC CULTURE OF THE MID-
DLE AGES, 1000-1300, at 34-38 (Waveland Press 1997) (1971).
9. Scholasticism came upon the intellectual scene in the late eleventh century. Its
method of learning was argumentative analysis rather than passive acceptance. Id. at
58-70. An early "handbook" of the scholastic method was appropriately titled Sic et
Non by Peter Abelard (of Heloise fame). M.T. CLANCHY, ABELARD: A MEDIEVAL
LIFE 6 (1997).
10. Even though scholasticism sought out discrepancies and inconsistencies it
found in the tests under analysis, it also sought to synthesize the apparent contradic-
tions it found. Moreover, the linchpin of scholasticism was religious (Catholic) faith.
Resolution of textual contradiction was driven, at least in the early years, by that
overarching concern. See BALDWIN, supra note 8, at 81, 94.
11. Two of the most important authors upon whom the Scholastics relied were not
even Christians: Aristotle, a pagan (known to Scholastics as "The Philosopher"),
whose translated writings became increasingly available to European scholars in the
High Middle Ages; and Ibn Rashd (known to medieval scholars variously as "Arer-
roes" or, simply, "The Commentator"), a Muslim philosopher whose facility in ren-
dering a lucid account of Aristotle's philosophical discourse made him indispensable
to Scholastics. See ARMAND A. MAURER, MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (Etienne Gilson
2d ed., Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1982) (1962). The story of how the
writings of Aristotle and the ancient Greek philosophers generally became available
to Catholic scholars in medieval Europe through the translations of Greek to Arabic
and, then, to Latin by Muslims and Jews in the Medieval Islamic kingdom of al-Anda-
lus on the Iberian peninsula (now, part of Spain) is itself a fascinating story of intellec-
tual discourse largely unimpeded by ideology and orthodoxy and demonstrate 1 3
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
point-counterpoint analysis of their meanings."2 It is important to un-
derstand that scholasticism's triumph over monasticism by 1300 was
largely attributed to the re-emergence of urbanization and commer-
cialization in the High Middle Ages, which brought with them a heter-
ogeneity of thought and a consequent need to develop techniques for
successful argument. That is to say that as trade and urban life
brought disparate groups into close proximity, the homogeneity of
thought mandated by Christian orthodoxy seemed outmoded and ir-
relevant. Even the Church was at least ambivalent about scholasti-
cism: on the one hand, scholasticism offered the possibility of
developing techniques for fending off arguments that challenged
Church teachings; on the other hand, scholasticism's reliance on non-
Christian texts and logical analysis of textual contradictions inherently
posed a threat to Church orthodoxy. 3
By the end of the High Middle Ages, critical changes had occurred
in political institutions and perception, as well as in intellectual institu-
tions and methods that laid the foundation for subsequent liberating
developments that gradually lifted constraints on individual freedoms.
It is, however, perhaps instructive to recall that the progression from
the medieval beginnings of these institutions to their present form was
hardly linear and consistent. Indeed, history from that era to this one
appears to be more circular than linear because it is replete with in-
stances, even periods, of regression, some of which (notably the
scourge of slavery) were discussed at the Gloucestershire confer-
ence. 4 The imminent threat posed by the Religious Right to free in-
quiry in American universities today (the topic of this paper) is
pluralism's facility in enriching the intellectual culture of a society. See MEDIEVAL
IBERIA: READINGS FROM CHRISTIAN, MUSLIM, AND JEWISH SOURCES (Olivia Remie
Constable ed., The Middle Ages Series, 1997); BERNARD F. REILLY, THE MEDIEVAL
SPAINS 202 (1993); L.P. HARVEY, ISLAMIC SPAIN: 1250 TO 1500 (1990) (detailing the
coexistence of Christians and Muslims in Medieval Spain); MARIA ROSA MENOCAL,
THE ORNAMENT OF THE WORLD: How MUSLIMS, JEWS, AND CHRISTIANS CREATED A
CULTURE OF TOLERANCE IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN (2002) (analyzing the culture in Medi-
eval Spain and the tolerance between Jews, Christians, and Muslims).
12. See CLANCHY, supra note 9, at 6.
13. Indeed, for sporadic and limited periods during the 13th century, popes
banned the teachings of Aristotle and/or some of his texts at the University. One
inescapable problem was that there were some conflicts between Church teachings
and Aristotelian and Islamic philosophy that simply could not be resolved or synthe-
sized. These included theologically critical issues like the duration of the world's exis-
tence, the nature of God, and the afterlife of the human soul. See MAURER, supra
note 11, at 89.
14. The first day included William Wiecek, T.K. Hunter, David Konig, Janis Mc-
Donald, Kathleen McKee, Regina Rauxloh, Elaine Dewhurst, Daniel Hulsebosch, Al-
fred Blumrosen, Stephen Waddams, and Margaret Russell. 2006 Gloucester
Conference, http://www.gloucesterconference.com/program6-19.asp (last visited Jan.
20, 2006). The second day included Colin Bobb-Semple, Cheryl Harris, Nicola Wil-
liams, Floyd Weatherspoon, Mary Louise Frampton, and Nekima Levy-Pounds. 2006
Gloucester Conference, http://www.gloucesterconference.com/programs6-20.asp (last
visited Jan. 20, 2006). 11
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another example of the occasional surfacing of regressive forces that
seek to roll back the evolutionary development of individual rights
guarantees.
Another related aspect of this nonlinear evolutionary progression
that we do well to emphasize is illustrated by the subject-matter of this
paper: that the project of protecting human rights continues to be a
work-in-progress whereby societal shifts may reveal hitherto unde-
tected weaknesses in institutional protections that expose the fragility
and remind us of the vulnerability of our human rights protections.
The American university model is the progeny of the European uni-
versity that has evolved since the High Middle Ages, just as our gov-
ernment institutions and our legal system are heir to European
successes in institutionalizing human rights principles. And while
there are differences, to be sure, among various models of higher edu-
cation in Western democratic societies, they share a common founda-
tion and (as was the case in medieval society) a mutually reinforcing
dynamic: freedom of inquiry at institutions of higher learning has his-
torically been an important source of advancing human freedoms in
the political sphere, while the legal systems of constitutional democra-
cies act as a bulwark against challenges to free inquiry in the univer-
sity. At least that is the common perception. Recent Supreme Court
case law appears to call that perception into question by opening the
door to assaults on this bedrock principle of free inquiry in higher
education.
Within a university, free inquiry is protected by the "university mis-
sion" itself. A typical statement of a university mission is: "[T]o de-
velop human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, to
extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its
campuses, and to serve and stimulate society by developing in stu-
dents heightened intellectual, culture and humane sensitivities... and
a sense of purpose.""5
This open system of free inquiry is buttressed by university rules
regarding academic freedom. The AAUP 16 forward to its Recom-
mended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure
offers a rationale for academic freedom when it states, in part: "A
college or university is a marketplace of ideas, and it cannot fulfill its
purposes of transmitting, evaluating and extending knowledge if it re-
quires conformity with any orthodoxy of content and method.517
15. This is the Mission Statement of the University of Wisconsin, at issue and
quoted in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221
(2000) (quoting Wis. STAT. § 36.07(1) (1993-1994)) and discussed infra notes 47-72
and accompanying text.
16. American Association of University Professors.
17. AM. Assoc. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 21 (8th
ed. 1995). 31
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Thus, the foundational concept of the university is its mission to
expand knowledge and understanding. And that mission, in turn, re-
lies upon academic freedom to bring it to fruition. However, in recent
years, public universities in the U.S. have faced an increasingly insis-
tent challenge to academic freedom that threatens to encroach upon
the "university missions" in substantial ways.18 The impetus for the
challenge comes from no less an august source than the Supreme
Court itself. Ambiguities in a newly-minted religious speech doc-
trine,' 9 created by the Rehnquist Court, have invited lawsuits filed by
Religious Right organizations against university programs. These law-
suits pose a real threat to the right of free inquiry of professors and of
academic departments, especially with regard to curricular and course
content issues.2 ° The Religious Right challenge (if successful) would
materially curtail, if not extinguish, the "university mission" to expand
knowledge and understanding. While the "university mission" re-
quires the diversity and pluralism afforded by academic freedom,
these lawsuits challenge that very premise on the grounds of religious
speech, using the Court's emergent "religious speech" doctrine as au-
thority. 21 The problem may be exacerbated at public universities by
the very recent decision of the Roberts Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos22
where, by a 5-4 majority, the Court held that the First Amendment
does not protect a government employee "from discipline based on
speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties. 'a3 Only when
a public employee speaks as a citizen on an issue of public debate
might the employer assert First Amendment rights superior to the
rights of the employer to discipline his speech.24 Without question,
this statement of the First Amendment rights of public employees
baldly threatens the academic freedom of scholars in public
universities. 25
18. See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
23. Id. at 1955, 1962.
24. See id. at 1957 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will
County, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
25. In Justice Souter's well-reasoned dissent, he-joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg-pointed out the majority's "new formulation": "'Restricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not in-
fringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commis-
sioned or created[,]"' is dangerous. Id. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at
1960). Justice Souter reflected upon the breadth of that statement and commented:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious
enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I
have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil First Amend-
ment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities,
whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to official duties.'
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Moreover, universities have not been able to point to any constitu-
tional doctrine in support of academic freedom and the "university
mission." Higher education cases that have raised academic freedom
issues in the past are long on expansive paeans to academic freedom
26
but short on any express doctrinal counterpoise that would limit either
the emergent religious speech doctrine's broad and indeterminate
reach27 or the uncertain boundaries of the brand new "public duties"
doctrine.
All is not lost, however, and help may be on the way. The recently
decided case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc.,28 in which plaintiffs ("FAIR") 29 challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Solomon Amendment, 30 also suggests an effective doc-
trinal defense for universities whose principles of academic freedom
are under siege. In that case, FAIR argued that the Solomon Amend-
ment, which conditions a university's receipt of federal funds on its
willingness to accommodate military recruitment on campus, violated
the university's constitutional rights because the military discrimi-
nated on the basis of sexual orientation while plaintiff universities
stood by an anti-discrimination policy.3
FAIR lost the "battle" in the case32 but it may have gone a long
way toward winning the war against assaults on universities' freedom
of inquiry. One of FAIR's arguments was premised upon the notion
of associational rights,33 which the Supreme Court acknowledged uni-
versities were entitled. And in an elegant demonstration of the adage
that "what goes around, comes around," the Court also adopted
FAIR's argument that the relevant authority was the iteration of asso-
ciation rights in a 2000 Supreme Court decision.34 In that 2000 Su-
preme Court decision, the Court held that a state government public
accommodation law violated the Boy Scouts' expressive association
rights to discriminate against gays.35 What goes around . . .comes
around.
It would be a lovely piece of irony if the Supreme Court case that
established an association doctrine in support of discrimination
Id. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
26. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text for an analysis of the destabi-
lizing effects of the doctrine.
28. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (2006); see infra notes 108-72 and accompanying text for discussion of the
FAIR case.
29. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights is an association of law schools
and law faculties. Id. at 1302.
30. See id. at 1303.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1313.
33. See id. at 1303.
34. See id. at 1311-12 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000)).
35. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 1 1
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(thereby constraining Freedom, Justice, and Equality) provided the
groundwork for the doctrine's subsequent development as a vehicle
for advancing Freedom, Justice, and Equality in our institutions of
higher education. In any case, the development of a system of free
inquiry within our intellectual institutions has been in the making for
800 years. It is about time our legal institutions provided us with a
doctrine to protect it.
This article proceeds chronologically. It begins in Part II with the
dismantling of the traditional religious clauses and free speech balanc-
ing doctrines by the Rehnquist Court. The Rehnquist Court's doc-
trine applicable to religious speech in "the university" developed in
several cases, culminating in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys.
v. Southworth36 Part III analyzes that case and its doctrine and ex-
plains how it poses a danger to free inquiry in higher education. Part
IV chronicles the litigious aftermath of Southworth, which demon-
strates how Southworth opened the door for Religious Right chal-
lenges to curricular programs; and it also identifies some evidence of a
resultant chilling effect on curricular policy-making. Part V reviews
the FAIR case and suggests how the associational rights doctrine
might provide a counterpoise to the Religious Right's siege on free
inquiry.
II. THE DISMANTLING THE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS CLAUSES
AND FREE SPEECH BALANCING DOCTRINES BY THE
REHNQUIST COURT
The First Amendment37 is fecund with promises. Among other
characteristics, it contains two provisions for religion and at least one
for speech.3" With regard to the latter, it famously promises "freedom
of speech."39 With regard to the former, it provides both protection
for the "free exercise" of religion and protection from the governmen-
tal "establishment of religion."4 ° The potential for conflict between
these two clauses is apparent: At what point does accommodation of
one religious group's religious freedom under government auspices
give rise to the charge that the government's solicitude toward that
group situates it as a state religion with respect to other religious
36. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
220-21 (2000).
37. The Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment I provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion [the "Establish-
ment Clause"], or prohibiting the free exercise thereof [the "Free Exercise Clause,"
and collectively, the "Religion Clauses"]; or abridging the freedom of speech [the
"Free Speech" Clause], or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-






2007] ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE UNIVERSITY
groups? Traditional jurisprudence developed by Supreme Courts that
preceded the former Rehnquist Court maintained a balance between
the two religious clauses (the "free exercise" clause, on the one hand,
and the "establishment clause" on the other) giving weight to each
clause by-among other doctrinal techniques-treating religious
speech as unique and different from secular speech under the "free-
dom of speech" clause. That distinction between religious and secular
speech supplied the doctrinal link and provided a synthesizing ele-
ment between the two religious clauses.
Religious expression under the doctrine was limited when it became
entangled with the government such that it gave the appearance of
receiving a special governmental imprimatur. This distinction be-
tween religious speech and secular speech is particularly important in
the context of "the university" because, as is evident, religious speech
is premised on religious belief, while secular speech, in the same con-
text, is premised upon empiricism and logic. The dichotomy is similar
to that which appeared, by the end of the 13th Century, between mo-
nasticism, on the one hand and scholasticism (and, by the 18th cen-
tury, empiricism) on the other.
But the Rehnquist Court abandoned that traditional approach by
conflating secular speech and religious speech under the First Amend-
ment; by treating religious speech as simply another "view point;" and
by interposing a new test of "viewpoint neutrality" as a litmus test for
determining the constitutionality of the government's treatment of re-
ligious speech. In the public university context, the "viewpoint neu-
trality" test was enunciated in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ, of Va.41 There, the University refused to allocate student activ-
41. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30
(1995). For background on this issue, see generally Marci Hamilton, The Constitu-
tion's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between Church and State, 1 A.L.I.-A.B.A. His-
TORIC PRESERVATION L. 501, 506 (1998) (discussing the Framers' concerns about
protecting religion from society and society from religion: "[R]eligion is as often the
source as it is the recipient of oppression."). See also Noah Feldman, From Liberty to
Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002)
(an overview of the development of Establishment Clause justification); Kent Green-
await, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses,
1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323 (1996) (reviewing and critiquing the traditional tests under
the two Religion Clause precedents); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86
MICH. L. REV. 266, 268-72 (1988) (challenging the efficacy of the neutrality test as it
was developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), applied in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and amended by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch,
465 U.S. at 688-92); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment
Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 83, 94-130 (1986) (investigating the doctrine as it
was first enunciated in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)); Liza Weiman
Hanks, Note, Justice Souter: Defining "Substantive Neutrality" in an Age of Religious
Politics, 48 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1996) (describing Justice Souter's reliance on prece-
dent in order to maintain the proper balance among the clauses and showing how his
analysis differed from the Rehnquist Court majority who dismantled that balance). 3 19
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ity fee money to a student-run religious newspaper. 42 The University
decided that, because the newspaper advocated a particular religious
dogma, financial support of the newspaper by the University would
create an Establishment Clause problem. That is to say, it would asso-
ciate a public university with a particular theology.43 And, under the
traditional tests, that was a fair reading of what the doctrine (enunci-
ated by earlier Supreme Courts) required. 44 But the Rehnquist Court
decided that speech (even religious proselytizing speech) was simply
speech. Thus, as long as the student activity fee program was adminis-
tered in a way that was "view point neutral," the University would not
violate the Establishment Clause by including a student religious ac-
tivity in its pool of fund recipients. Simply including religious support
for student-run, extra-curricular programs was not, according to the
Court, a violation of the Establishment Clause.4 5
On its face, and under the facts, the Rosenberger case could appear
benign and, well, neutral: it simply provided a shield for a university
that gave extra-curricular fund support to a religious student group for
an extra-curricular activity. But Justice Souter perceived the "view-
point neutrality" test as a slippery slope, and the next case to apply
the test after Rosenberger, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworh,4 6 demonstrated just how accurate Souter's perception
was. In Southworth, the University's shield (the "viewpoint neutral-
ity" test) became the Religious Right's sword.
III. THE SOUTHWORTH DOCTRINE THE DANGER IT POSES TO
FREE INQUIRY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Southworth was another case brought by a group of students, this
time with the financial support of a religious advocacy organization,
the Alliance Defense Fund. The self-proclaimed purpose of the or-
ganization was, according to the New York Times, "defunding the
42. For an excellent discussion of the futility of interposing a neutrality test in
Establishment Clause analysis, see Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA.
L. REV. 489 (2004). Professor Ravitch argues that because there is no such thing as -
absolute formal neutrality, a more conceptualized test that looks to the effect on relig-
ion of a government policy or activity is a better measuring tool for constitutional
analysis. See id. at 572; see also Philip B. Kirkland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961) (discussing formal neutrality as an analyt-
ical tool); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality To-
ward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 995-1001 (1990) (arguing that a formal
neutrality test is unworkable).
43. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23, 827.
44. See id. at 823.
45. See id. at 845-46.
46. 529 U.S. 217 (2002). The University could reasonably have believed the situa-
tion created an entangling alliance under the Lemon test. See supra note 42 and ac-
companying text.
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left."47 As in Rosenberger, the plaintiff group in Southworth chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the University's student activity fee
program.48 The Southworth group, however, unlike the Rosenberger
students, sued not because they wanted to be included in the program
but because they wanted either to exclude groups with which they dis-
agreed or they wanted to exclude themselves (by opting out of the
campus-wide requirement to pay into the student activity fee pro-
gram). 49 Thus, the shield that protected the University from a charge
violating the Establishment Clause by including a religious group in
the program became a sword thrust against other groups within the
program and against the University that had included them.
In Southworth, the Religious Right students argued that the
mandatory student activity fee forced them to support student organi-
zations with which they disagreed, thereby violating the Religious
Right students' First Amendment rights of free speech, free associa-
tion, and free exercise.5" In an unpublished opinion, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin agreed and
granted the students' motion for summary judgment.5 1 The court pre-
mised its decision on two Supreme Court cases52 that held unconstitu-
tional an organization's attempt to compel individuals to subsidize
political speech that the individuals opposed when the speech was not
directly related to the organization's mission: Abood v. Detroit Board.
of Educ.53 and Keller v. State Bar of Cal.54 The University of Wiscon-
sin appealed and the Seventh Circuit ruled that the mandatory student
activity fee program was not germane to the University's mission and,
therefore, violated the constitutional rights of the Religious Right stu-
dents. The Circuit reasoned that not only the AboodlKeller rule but
also the Rosenberger case compelled its decision.56
47. Linda Greenhouse, No Student Veto for Campus Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2000, at Al.
48. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220-2. For a more detailed review of Southworth,
see Barbara K. Bucholtz, On Canonical Transformations and the Coherence of Di-
chotomies: Jazz, Jurisprudence, and the University Mission, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 425,
428-38 (2002) [hereinafter Canonical Transformations].
49. See Greenhouse, supra note 47.
50. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 227.
51. Id. at 217.
52. Id.
53. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-36 (1977). The Supreme
Court held the dues unconstitutionally infringed on the teachers' free speech and free
association rights. See id. at 234-35.
54. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990). In Keller, the Supreme
Court applied the same rule to mandatory state bar association fees and found that, to
the extent the fees supported the bar's political agenda (and not its mission to im-
prove the quality of legal practice) the fees unconstitutionally infringed upon Califor-
nia lawyers' free speech and free association rights. Id. at 13-14.
55. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1998).
56. See id.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with the result and the rationale of
the Seventh Circuit (thereby reversing), but it did so in a way that
expanded its nascent "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine to accommodate
the Religious Right group, thereby transforming a shield into a sword
that has subsequently posed a threat to academic freedom and the
"university mission."57 How did the Court create this unfortunate
result?
In the first place, the Court agreed with the district court and the
Seventh Circuit that the plaintiff-students' rights were Abood/Keller
rights, but the Court concluded that the Abood/Keller tests were inap-
plicable in the context of an organization with such a broad mission.5"
That mission, to expand knowledge and understanding, was more ap-
propriately analyzed under the Rosenberger "viewpoint neutrality"
test, the Court said, because the test acknowledged the University's
arguably boundless mission while constraining its policies in realizing
its mission to an even-handed neutrality.59 In addition to this broad,
theoretical approach, the Court also acknowledged that: (1) given the
breadth of the "university mission," the Seventh Circuit erred in hold-
ing that the student activity program was unconstitutional, 0 and (2)
that, as a practical matter, the Abood/Keller test would destroy these
extracurricular activity programs.6
By contrast, the Court decided that the Rosenberger test appropri-
ately supports the program as long as its distribution of the funds is
"view point neutral." And, applying Rosenberger to the facts in
Southworth where the parties had stipulated, at the trial level, to the
"viewpoint neutrality" of the student activity program, the Wisconsin
program was deemed to have passed constitutional muster.62 In the
immediate aftermath of the Southworth decision, it was hailed as a
victory for higher education. And, at first glance, a "viewpoint neu-
trality" test seems well-suited to the University's mission to expand
knowledge and understanding. "Viewpoint neutrality" certainly
sounds inclusive enough to protect the free-ranging speech that is cru-
cial to the University's mission. But sober reflection and subsequent
events reveal the emergent "viewpoint neutrality" test, post-South-
worth, to be seriously flawed.
The first aspect of the test that is problematic is its analytical start-
ing point: the Supreme Court's enunciation of students' rights as
rights-not-to-associate with speech that offends them or with which
57. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 227-28.
58. Id. at 231-32.
59. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
60. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 227, 231-32.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 232-33 (stating that the University's mission "undertakes to stimulate
the whole universe of speech and ideas[,]" and "[t]he University may determine that
its mission is well served" by such a program by engaging students in debate, advo-
cacy, and dialogue). I?
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they disagree (Abood/Keller rights). Is it reasonable to posit Aboodi
Keller rights against an organization with a mission of free inquiry? Is
not the purpose of free inquiry to serve the "university mission" of
expanding knowledge and understanding by a dialogic process in
which competing ideas are given latitude to tease out new understand-
ings?63 Does not premising students' First Amendment rights in the
university open the power to exclude ideas, compromise the mission
of the university at the outset, and evince a lack of understanding, at
some fundamental level, about the nature of free inquiry? Recall that
the Southworth students did not assert rights to be included. Rather
they, and students in subsequent cases, sought to have the speech of
others excluded. Southworth's concession to the plaintiff-students,
granting them rights-not-to-associate with speech they oppose, is fa-
tally flawed because it fails to acknowledge the diverse and disputa-
tious nature of intellectual speech, which is at the very heart of the
university project.
Thus, under the emergent doctrine, as it is currently constituted,
students have a valid legal claim, and a prima facie case, whenever
they assert that speech in a university offends their religious sensibili-
ties or the tenets of their faith. The burden of proof, then, is thrust
upon a university to demonstrate the speech is one of "neutrality."
Having asserted Abood/Keller rights, students can compel the univer-
sity to prove its Rosenberger "viewpoint neutrality."
It follows that the second serious flaw in Southworth's development
of Rosenberger's "viewpoint neutrality" test, is that, as Justice Souter
pointed out, it flips the burden of proof. Under the facts of Rosenber-
ger, a program that included religious projects did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause unless it was not "view point neutral" (plaintiff's
burden of proof); under Southworth, a university program challenged
under Abood/Keller is unconstitutional unless it can demonstrate it is
"viewpoint neutral"64 (university's burden of proof).
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the Southworth Court was
not put to the test of applying its own rendition of the Rosenberger
doctrine to the facts of the Southworth case because the parties' stipu-
lation to the "viewpoint neutrality" that most of the University's pro-
gram satisfied the test. What would have happened in Southworth had
the parties not stipulated? The Seventh Circuit had occasion to pon-
63. To paraphrase the Court, if each student were free to select what his or her fee
would support, free student organizations and programs (as Abood/Keller seem to
mandate) would be confronted with an administrative nightmare. See id. at 232.
64. After all, intellectual debate is not a zero-sum game or winner-take-all sport-
ing event. Rather, debate in higher education is "an ongoing process that explores
new intellectual territory and reassesses the existing intellectual terrain on both sides
of the theoretical divide. That exploration and reassessment is a dialogic negotiation
that leads to the goals envisioned by the university mission: the expansion of human
understanding in all its vicissitudes." Canonical Transformations, supra note 48, at
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der that conundrum when the Supreme Court remanded the case for
resolution of the remaining issue65 and the plaintiff-students, upon re-
mand, withdrew their stipulation in its entirety. Whereupon, noting
the absence of guidance in the Court's opinion concerning application
of the "viewpoint neutrality" test, the Seventh Circuit sua sponte con-
cluded the entire program was "viewpoint neutral. '66 And, there, the
matter of Southworth stands: without any resolution of what factors
courts will consider when determining whether universities have met
their new burden of proof or, even, whether the Seventh Circuit "got
it right" in Southworth.6 7
We can anticipate the reaction of universities to such an ambiguous
and indeterminate burden of proof. The threat of litigation alone
might induce universities to eliminate programs rather than risk ex-
pensive and protracted litigation. Moreover, operating under a Dam-
ocles sword of litigation could chill academic and scholarly speech.
The threat is exacerbated where, as here, a university's burden of
proof is so amorphous.
And it follows logically from the problems of operating under an
indeterminate burden of proof that another problem posed by the
"viewpoint neutrality" test is the eponymous ambiguity of the test it-
self. What constitutes "neutrality"? Is "neutrality" even possible?
What kind of facts need to be garnered to prove it? Is "neutrality"
even a unworkable test?68 Furthermore, even assuming the nature of
neutrality is ascertainable and achievable, What does it mean to be
"viewpoint neutral"? Must all views on a given issue be equally repre-
sented? We simply do not know, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged when it addressed the issue subsequently.69
And that problem raises another indeterminacy of the test: we do
not know how far into the life of "the university" the test will extend.
The Southworth case involved an extracurricular program, but there is
nothing inherently limiting in the "viewpoint neutrality" test that fore-
closes its application to all programs in higher education. In South-
65. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 236. Justice Souter summarized that the South-
worth majority mistakenly raises the University's burden of proof to include view-
point neutrality as a necessary and sufficient condition for constitutionality. See id. at
236 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. While both parties agreed that the bulk of the student activity program was
administered in a view point neutral manner, plaintiff-students questioned the view-
point neutrality of one aspect of the program in which funding decisions were ren-
dered by majority voting. See id. at 224-25.
67. The Court supported its conclusion on the basis that the student activity pro-
gram's funding standards and appeals process were sufficient to prove its viewpoint
neutrality. See Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566,
595 (7th Cir. 2002).
68. See Laycock, supra note 42, at 995-1001.
69. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for incisive discussions of these in-
tractable problems. 1,
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worth, the Court stated that the test would "likely '70 not be imposed
on curricular programs. This is little comfort when you consider the
porous boundary between curricular and extra-curricular programs.
Think, for example, of hybrid programs including summer abroad pro-
grams. Where do you draw the line?
The Rosenberger Court also made a futile attempt to distinguish be-
tween government (or public university) speech and private (student)
speech by looking to the source of funding for each kind of speech.
As Justice Souter stated in his Rosenberger dissent, "The opinion of
the Court makes the novel assumption that only direct aid financed
with tax revenue is barred [from Rosenberger 'viewpoint neutrality'
analysis] and draws the erroneous conclusion that the involuntary Stu-
dent Activities Fee is not a tax."'71 But the distinction, as Souter
points out, between taxpayer-funded speech and student-funded
speech is similarly chimerical since university programs often have
multiple sources of financing. Thus, neither the distinction between
curricular and extracurricular nor the line between tax or tuition-
based and student-fee-based programs can give us guidance or com-
fort about the reach of the "viewpoint neutrality" rule.
Finally, by treating religious speech as simply speech, the "view-
point neutrality" doctrine eliminates any consideration of the Estab-
lishment Clause problems the test will certainly generate or any
recognition that at some point (but what point?) the Establishment
Clause must surely be invoked.
Given the indeterminacies, the ambiguities, and the serious flaws in
the emergent "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine, it is a small wonder
that, following Southworth, there has been a flurry of legal activity by
Religious Right and ultra-conservative groups seeking, in a variety of
ways, to solidify and expand the doctrinal territory they gained in
Southworth. Moreover, like the plaintiff-students in Southworth, the
Religious Right's goal is to silence and exclude. But, they go beyond
Southworth and its concern with extra curricular activities: now target-
ing the context of speech in core activities of "the university." The
plaintiff-students seek to eliminate curricular or academic programs
70. See Canonical Transformations, supra note 48, at 436.
71. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 864-65
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("Where the Uni-
versity speaks, either in its own name . . . or . . . through its diverse faculties, the
analysis likely would be altogether different.") (emphasis added), quoted in Canonical
Transformations, supra note 48, at 435-36 (noting that in Rosenberger/South worth,
the Court relocates the traditional "viewpoint neutrality" test from a physical forum,
like a public park, to an incorporeal forum, like the subject-matter of a course.
"When the Court leaps from the terra firma of the street corner, public parks, and
rooms in buildings to the incorporeal region occupied by a mandatory student fee
program, which even the Rosenberger Court acknowledged to be more 'metaphysical'
than a public park, then certain issues arise. Most obvious in the questions of where
you draw the circle around an incorporeal force field we must now call a Southworth
'forum,' subject to viewpoint neutrality." (citations omitted)).
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or perspectives with which they disagree. And, it is no surprise that
the assault has had a chilling effect on university programs. 72
IV. THE LITIGIOUS AFTERMATH OF SOUTHWORTH
Take, for example, the case of Yacovelli v. Moesser.3 In July 2002,
three unnamed students, members of the entering class at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina (UNC), with the support of a Religious Right
organization, American Family Association Center for Law & Policy,
sued UNC. 4 The students argued that their Southworth religious
speech rights were violated by a reading and study assignment for in-
coming students.75 The book assigned to the incoming freshmen was
Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations, written by Michael
Sells, a religion professor at Haverford College. In sum, the students
argued that the Southworth "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine gave the
students the right to veto curricular decisions of a major public univer-
sity and to preclude discussion of topics that were anathema to
them.76 On August 15, 2003, by minute entry, the court denied the
students' motion for preliminary injunction; 77 whereupon, the stu-
dents requested and were granted interlocutory appeal to the circuit
court.78 Contemporaneously, the executive committee of the faculty
of UNC passed a resolution reaffirming the Academic Freedom Code,
Section 600 of the Code of the Board of Governors of the University
of North Carolina. 79 UNC's president stated that "The campus' selec-
72. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 896 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
74. Civil Docket, Yacovelli, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (No. 1:02-CV-596).
75. See Yacovelli, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
76. See id. In the students' "Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint," the students state, in part, that:
The University compelled the freshmen to read, meditate on, discuss and
write on a sacred religious text .... [I]t required the students to listen to the
chants of Muslim religious leaders recite a call to prayer in Arabic. The
book.. . presents a decidedly favorable slant to the religion of peace.... No
other religion has been given such attention.
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
at 12-13, Yacovelli, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (No. 1:02-CV-596).
77. See Minute Entry, Yacovelli, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (No. 1:02-CV-596).
78. Notice of Interlocutory Appeal of Oral Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Yacovelli, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760 (No. 1:02-CV-596).
79. THE CODE OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIV. OF N.C., § 600(1)
(9th ed. 2006), available at http://intranet.northcarolina.edu/docs/legal/policymanual/
100.1_TheCode.pdf. Section 600 states:
(1) The University of North Carolina is dedicated to the transmission and
advancement of knowledge and understanding. Academic freedom is essen-
tial to the achievement of these purposes. The University therefore supports
and encourages freedom of inquiry for faculty members and students, to the
end that they may responsibly pursue these goals through teaching, learning,
research, discussion, and publication, free from internal or external re-
straints that would unreasonably restrict their academic endeavors.
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tion for summer 2002-Approaching the Qur'an by Michael Sells-
was influenced by the attacks of 9-11 and intended to introduce stu-
dents to the culture of the Middle East and to engage students on the
very relevant, but little-understood, topic of Islam."8 On August 22,
2002, the chair of the Board of Governors asked the Board to reaffirm
its "historic, unchanged position"81 on academic freedom. However,
the resolution in support failed to garner the requisite two-thirds vote
of the Board of Governors.82
During the same time period, one house (the Senate) of the North
Carolina Legislature passed a bill that would ban funding of religious
courses to be offered to incoming freshmen unless the courses gave
equal time to all religions.83 That bill was deleted by the appropria-
tions committee of the House and Senate in their final session of the
legislation.84
Eventually, the interlocutory appeal in Yacovelli was withdrawn,
and subsequently, the case was dismissed.85 Nonetheless, the case was
actively pursued for two years, and the firestorm it generated illus-
trates how tenuous the principles of academic freedom and the "uni-
versity mission" appear since Southworth's indeterminacies and
ambiguities have seemed to undermine them. And, there is, at least,
anecdotal evidence that the lawsuit had a chilling effect on UNC's
subsequent book selections.
In 2004, the book selection for the incoming freshman class at UNC
was Absolutely American: Four Years at West Point, by David Lipsky,
a former West Point cadet.86 While members of the selection commit-
80. Board of Governors Committee Reaffirms Academic Freedom, BULLETIN ON-




83. S. 1115 § 9.5A, 2001-2002 Sess. (N.C. 2002) (5th ed.), available at http://www.
ncleg.net/sessions/2001/Bills/Senate/PDF/S1115v5.pdf. The bill declares, in pertinent
part:
Section 9.5A. No state funds or overhead receipts may be expended by a
constituent of The University of North Carolina to offer for entering fresh-
man students prior to their first semester for credit or otherwise any course
or summer reading program in any religion unless all other known religions
are offered in an equal or incremental way. This section is not intended to
interfere with academic freedom, but to ensure that all religions are taught
in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Id.
84. See Current Operations, Capital Improvements, and Finance Act of 2002,
2001-2002 N.C. Sess. Laws, available at http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/
SessionLaws/PDF/2001-2002/SL2002-126.pdf.
85. See Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760, 765 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
86. DAVID LIPSKY, ABSOLUTELY AMERICAN (2003); see Bill Cessato, Wary of
Controversy, UNC-Chapel Hill Picks Book on West Point for Freshmen To Read This
Summer, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 26, 2004, http://chronicle.com/daily/2004/02/
2004022605n.htm. Cessato reports that the other finalist that year was Bill McKib-
ben's, Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age (2003). Id. '7
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tee at UNC thought the book would offer an interesting read for in-
coming freshmen, they also acknowledged that their choice (a non-
controversial one from a Religious Right viewpoint) had been heavily
influenced by the pending lawsuit. a7 And no wonder. Following its
2002 book selection on the Koran that triggered the Yacovelli lawsuit,
the book selection committee in 2003 chose Barbara Ehrenrich's
Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America, in which she de-
scribes her first-hand experiences as one of the working poor. This
also incited the Religious Right, which dubbed the book "sacrile-
gious." 88 The Religious Rights' charge has gravitas only because of
the apparent imprimatur granted to the Religious Right by the emer-
gent "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine and its consequent challenge to
the "university mission" and to academic freedom on the grounds
proffered by the Court's newly minted religious speech protection.
Opposition to any academic program on the grounds of religious
speech and association has become an extremely effective weapon. In
the future, universities can reasonably fear, and will undoubtedly face,
more lawsuits that must surely have a chilling effect on university
policy.89
But lawsuits are not the only tactic being employed: lobbying for
legislation and legislative initiatives poses a threat from another
source and enlists another branch of government-the legislature.
The "Academic Bill of Rights" is the most well-publicized of this kind
of initiative. 90 This initiative is currently finding its way into state leg-
87. The Chronicle of Higher Education quotes the chairperson of the selection
committee as conceding that "[w]hen we talked about a book, we thought also about
imagining it in the headlines and thinking about how it would be received." Id.
88. See id.; Eric Hoover, Chapel Hill Picks Book on Race Relations for Summer
Reading Assignment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 21, 2005, http://chronicle.com/
daily/2005/01/2005012103n.htm (stating that critics referred to the book as "pure lib-
eral propaganda" and "Christian bigotry").
89. As an example, in 2004, students who ran a Christian newspaper at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma sued the University claiming religious discrimination because
they did not receive the amount they requested from the student activity fund. See
Elizabeth F. Farrell, 2 Students Say U of Oklahoma Fee Decision Discriminated
Against Christian Newspaper, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Feb. 25, 2004, http:l/chronicle.
com/daily/2004/02/2004022503n.htm. A lawyer representing the organization that
backed them (Alliance Defense Fund) said that the University action violated the
"viewpoint neutrality" test and cited Rosenberger as the analogous precedent. See id.
The Christian newspaper received only $150 of the $2300 it requested. See id. The
University explained that: (1) it does not grant money to fund religious services; (2)
the newspaper did not sponsor its own fund raising activities; and (3) the newspaper
had "reprinted syndicated articles without copyright permission." See id. Nonethe-
less, the president of the University, after finding no evidence of discrimination, estab-
lished an ad hoc committee that decided to give the newspaper an additional $500
anyway. See id. Subsequently, the University settled the lawsuit by changing its pol-
icy and awarded the newspaper $2,500 (more than its original request). See Elizabeth
F. Farrell, Notebook, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 13, 2004, at A31.
90. See Sara Hebel, Patrolling Professors' Politics: Conservative Activists and Stu-
dents Press Campaigns Against Perceived Bias on Campuses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash, D.C.), Feb. 13, 2004, at A18. The initiative was developed by David Horowitz3 2 8
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islation. It is ostensibly designed to fight liberalism and to measure
diversity by ideological viewpoint, but it misperceives the nature of
intellectual discourse. No less an authority than Judge Richard Posner
(hardly a liberal ideologue) has said that the "Academic Bill of
Rights" turns the issue inside out by compelling faculty hires on the
basis of their politics, not on the quality of their academic work. 91
Both leaders of the "Academic Bill of Rights" initiative and the Relig-
ious Right misapprehend the nature of academic freedom and intel-
lectual debate. 92 Both political ideologues and Religious Right
zealots who support the "Academic Bill of Rights" initiative posit a
zero-sum game between intransigent ideologues. It is their view that
intellectual debate is a winner-take-all war between opposing "faiths."
In fact, intellectual debate among competing ideas in university tradi-
tion relies on the persuasive force of logic, research, and empirical
evidence. In that process of expanding knowledge and understanding,
the intransigence of argument based simply on faith or ideology is ir-
relevant. 93 The Scientific American, in a pointedly ironic April Fool's
president of the California-based Center for the Study of Popular Culture. Id. The
initiative calls upon Congress to enact "principles" by which colleges and universities
must abide. Id. These principles mandate that a diversity of ideological viewpoint be
compelled in tenure decisions and in class syllabi. Id.
91. See Posting of Brian Leiter to Leiter Reports, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/
blog/2004/12/index.html (Dec. 19, 2004, 5:44 PM). The posting states:
There is no doubt that the academy is to the left of the society at large; there
is also no doubt that views to the right of the society at large are better
represented in the academy than anywhere else. The fact remains for genu-
ine diversity of political viewpoint, no other major institution in American
society holds a candle to the universities: not corporations, not law firms, not
Congress .... That is as it should be given the tasks charged to universities,
but what is amazing is that-in keeping with the "black-is-white" moment
we're living in America ... now The Economist is doing its bit to propagate
this "big lie." . . . The Economist attributes the academic right's desertion of
the Republican Party not to that Party's having gone off the rails, but rather
to the academy's having done so! . . .There is no doubt that serious aca-
demic disciplines are "rigged" against Straussians [as ultra-conservatives
have persuaded The Economist], since they are "rigged" (at least when
working well) against scholarly incompetence. But how could one expect
journalists to be able to assess that claim? One would actually have to know
something, for example, about the actual quality of Allan Bloom's transla-
tion of The Republic or Leo Strauss's interpretation of the same text to real-
ize that the absence of Straussians from philosophy and classics
departments-indeed, their absence even from politics departments outside
North America-is entirely on the merits. Let us hope that universities re-
main inhospitable to diversity of scholarly mediocrity.
Id.
92. See, for example, the discussion of the literary "culture wars" in Canonical
Transformations, supra note 48, at 438-443. "[A] closer look at this most famous
version of the past decades' academic culture wars reveals certain themes that amount
to a leitmotif-what we have here is not a permanent schism, but the process [of
reasonable argument] by which human knowledge and understanding is refined and
expanded, whatever else its bellicose visage seems to convey." Id. at 443.
93. Paul Krugman, An Academic Question, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at A23.
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Day editorial titled, "Ok, We Give Up," "apologized" for endorsing
the theory of evolution: "[A]s editors, we had no business being per-
suaded by mountains of evidence [and in succumbing] to the easy mis-
take of thinking that scientists understand their fields better than, say,
U.S. senators or best-selling novelists do."94 The United States Con-
gress has also weighed in on the issue.9 5 And at least one university
made a valiant but unavailing effort to accommodate the "viewpoint
neutrality" craze with a five-year plan to select faculty on the basis of
their "cultural competency."96 Even Phi Beta Kappa's "viewpoint
neutrality" had been called into question.97
This maelstrom of challenges to the "university mission" and aca-
demic freedom is directly attributable to the very questionable and
certainly abstruse Rosenberger/South worth "viewpoint neutrality"
doctrine. In its current posture, it could reasonably be interpreted to
impose an all-inclusive and mathematically balanced representation of
faith and ideologically based interests in teaching and scholarship.
Such an interpretation would undoubtedly imperil the American uni-
versity because it completely misconstrues the purpose to which aca-
demic freedom and discourse are put. But there is no question that, as
the doctrine stands today, it is a real threat to the university and its
traditional role of expanding knowledge and understanding.98 What
legal doctrine can universities employ to balance or juxtapose these
principles against the "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine? To date, there
is no such doctrine.
94. Id.
95. See Kelly Field, 'Political Rigidity' in Academe Undermines Federal Support for
Higher Education, Senator Tells Commission, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 12, 2005,
http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/12/2005121201n.htm.
96. See Scott Smallwood, U. of Oregon Backs Off Plan Linking Tenure and 'Cul-
tural Competency' After Faculty Members Balk, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 27,
2005, http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/0512005052702n.htm. Interjecting a note of rea-
son into the debate over the plan, a chemistry professor declared, "I was hired to
teach chemistry and do research.... I wasn't hired to be evaluated and even interro-
gated about cultural competency, whatever that is." Id.
97. See Sara Lipka, Free-Speech Group Questions Phi Beta Kappa's Commitment
to Academic Freedom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 16, 2005, at A36,
available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/i17/17aO3601.htm (reporting that when
Phi Beta Kappa rejected George Mason University's bid to open a chapter on its
campus, another "Rights" group, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
accused the honors society of inconsistently and selectively applying a speech code).
98. See Canonical Transformations, supra note 48, at 437-38 ("[G]iven the uncer-
tain reach of Southworth, there is always the danger that, in the context of a particu-
larly virulent and protracted ... culture war [like the one we witness today], courts
might be persuaded to temper traditional notions of academic freedom with some
version of the viewpoint neutrality rule [that is violative of the university's mission]" b 0
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V. THE ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AS A COUNTERPOISE
TO THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S SIEGE ON FREE INQUIRY
It is somewhat unnerving to review Supreme Court case law in
search of some kind of doctrine that protects the "university mission"
and academic freedom. The Supreme Court's higher education cases
that have raised academic freedom issues abound with eloquent trib-
utes to academic freedom but lack any doctrinal counterpoise that
would limit Southworth's broad and indeterminate reach.99 Each
carefully acknowledges and even lauds the virtues of academic free-
dom and/or the "university mission" with the eloquence that dicta
permits; but, in each case, the constitutional grounds for the decision
never rest on a doctrine addressing the special constitutional protec-
tions these bedrock canons require. An example is Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire:'00
In a university, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an
end.... A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its
ideal being the ideal of Socrates-"tQ follow the argument where it
leads." This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject
traditional ideas and beliefs .... It is the business of the university
to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation.
10 1
A tribute, to be sure, but one with no doctrinal teeth. What the
universities require is a doctrine that is consonant with the "university
mission" to expand knowledge and understanding through free in-
quiry and argument premised upon academic freedom. That means,
99. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215, 226
(1985) (ruling on a narrow due process question but extolling the virtues of academic
freedom); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (acting as the immediate precursor
to Rosenberer and employing the public forum test to find that students' rights to use
university facilities could not be trumped by the university mission); Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (ruling state
Cold War legislation was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, but also eulogizing
the importance of academic freedom); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)
(holding was based on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds but praising the
importance of free inquiry); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (ruling state
Cold War legislation was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); id. at 196-98
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (eulogizing the importance of academic freedom). More
recent cases have taken a similar approach. See Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n. of
Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 526 U.S. 124, 125 (1999) (per curiam)
(deciding an academic freedom case on Equal Protection Clause grounds); Univ. of
Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (finding no academic freedom under the Constitu-
tion to withhold confidential peer review information relevant to discrimination);
Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 273 (1989) (finding that no
special First Amendment right for academic freedom-assuming there is one-cre-
ates free speech rights of professors to oppose collective bargaining procedure). For
additional cases that follow the same pattern, see Canonical Transformations, supra
note 48, at 464 n.248.
100. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
101. Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in
S. Afr. 10-12).
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at a minimum, that AboodlKeller °2 rights to exclude or silence views
with which some individuals disagree must be recognized as anath-
ema. Given the "university mission," students' First Amendment
rights are more properly characterized as rights to be heard and in-
cluded, rather than rights to silence or exclude. Another contiguous
aspect of the doctrine should recognize that intellectual debate in the
university context is premised upon research, empirical evidence, and
logic, not upon religious faith, dogma, political affiliation, or ideology.
That recognition should illuminate the dangers that the inappropriate
"viewpoint neutrality" test poses. Freedom of inquiry requires a doc-
trine to act as a counterpoise to the overreaching and the mispercep-
tions about open debate that the Rosenberger/Southworth decisions
have created.
The problem posed by the RosenbergerlSouthworth "viewpoint neu-
trality" rule has been recently compounded by the Garcetti decision
denying First Amendment protections to public employees' speech ut-
tered in their "official duties. 1 ° 3 For scholars in public universities,
Rosenberger/Southworth and, now, Garcetti may become the one-two
punch that knocks academic freedom out of higher education.
Garcetti has created a false dichotomy: positioning speech by govern-
ment employees on cambered terrain so that public employee speech
must perforce be identified either as "official duty" speech with no
First Amendment protection or "citizen public issue" speech with,
possibly, some First Amendment protection. 1' 4 The danger of this ei-
ther/or conundrum is most evident in the context of university speech.
Like the amorphous taxonomies generated by the "viewpoint neutral-
ity" test (public funded versus private funded speech and curricular
versus extra curricular speech),' 015 this new "test" for First Amend-
ment protection seems destined to invite new challenges to academic
freedom. For, in which category does classroom speech and scholarly
publication belong: to the category labeled "public employment
speech" or to the category marked "citizen public issue speech"? It
could reasonably be argued, as Justice Souter did in his Garcetti dis-
sent, that if those are our only choices, it would appear that speech
generated by classroom duties and scholarly responsibilities are more
a species of "public employee" rather than "private citizen" speech.' 6
At this critical juncture it is, at the very least, prudent to press for the
development of a doctrine to protect both academic freedom and the
"university mission" that relies upon it.
102. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text discussing the Abood/Keller
rights. Southworth agreed with plaintiff-students that their rights, in the university
context, were Abood/Keller rights to exclude. See supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
103. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
104. See id. at 1956-62.
105. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 24. 33
[Vol. 13
2007] ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE UNIVERSITY 333
A recent decision by the Third Circuit seems to provide the doctri-
nal balance and counterpoise that is required to protect the kind of
diversity that is espoused by the "university mission" and that is en-
demic to academic freedom. In Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld,1°7 a group of law schools and individ-
ual faculty members10 8 appealed a decision denying their challenge to
the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. The named plain-
tiff (FAIR) argued that the amendment violated law schools' First
Amendment rights. Reversing the district court decision, the Third
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had stated claims that were likely to
succeed on the merits. 10 9
At the trial level, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment asserting that: (1) it imper-
missibly conditioned a benefit on the relinquishment of constitutional
rights in violation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions; (2) it
discriminated against law schools that upheld their anti-bigotry poli-
cies by refusing to admit military recruiters to their premises; and (3)
its opaque guidelines conferred "unbridled discretion on military bu-
reaucrats" thereby running afoul of the void for vagueness doctrine.110
The Solomon Amendment111 permits the Secretary of Defense to
deny federal funding to universities (including separate graduate
schools, like law school) that refuse to give military recruiters access
to its students." 2 The Solomon Amendment (originally passed in
1994) is the most recent attempt by Congress to discourage university
policies foreclosing military recruitment on campus by withholding
federal financial support from universities. 3  The Amendment
broadened the coverage of earlier legislation, and in its most recent
version, it requires schools to give military recruiters access in a man-
107. 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
108. Named plaintiffs included the FAIR corporation itself, a consortium for law
schools; the Society of American Law Teachers; the Coalition for Equality; Rutgers
Gay and Lesbian Caucus / (law professors); Pam Nickisher, Michael Blauschild, and
Leslie Fischer (law students); Erwin Chemerinsky and Sylvia Law. Id. at 219-20.
109. See id. at 224.
110. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Right, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 291
F. Supp. 2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003).
111. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000).
112. Subsection (b) of the Amendment reads, in part:
DENIAL OF FUNDS FOR PREVENTING MILITARY RECRUITING ON CAMPUS.-
No funds described in subsection (d)(2) may be provided by contract or by
grant... to an institution of higher education ... if the Secretary of Defense
determines that that institution . . . has a policy or practice . . . that either
prohibits, or in effect prevents-(1) the Secretary of a military department
or Secretary of Transportation from gaining entry to campuses, or access to
students... on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting; or (2) access by
military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the following infor-
mation pertaining to students ... enrolled at that institution.
Id.
113. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
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ner "'at least equal in quality and scope to that afforded to other
employers.""4
For their part, most U.S. law schools and their professional Associa-
tion'1 5 operate under nondiscrimination policies that include a com-
mitment to ensuring only prospective employers that attest to their
own nondiscrimination policies would be permitted to recruit students
for employment on law school premises." 6
For its part, the military does discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation through its "don't ask-don't tell" policies.117 And, in re-
cent years, the Department of Defense has been increasingly insistent
that law schools be fully compliant with the Solomon Amendment.
The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon
Amendment on three grounds of unconstitutionality. 8 But the dis-
trict court,11 9 applying the established rules for injunctive relief," °
found that plaintiffs were unable to show their likelihood of success
on the merits of their claims. The plaintiffs were unable to show the
likelihood of success because, while the spending power of Congress
can not be used to condition a benefit upon a right, here, the Solomon
Amendment's interference with plaintiffs' constitutional rights was
merely "incidental" and "attenuated." '21 This minimal effect does not
rise to the level of the relinquishment of constitutional rights (of
114. See id. at 278 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 216.4(c)(3) (2005)). The Court identified
the kinds of federal funding covered by the Solomon Amendment by way of Depart-
ment of Education regulations. See id. at 279. The coverage under the Solomon
Amendment includes funding for "non-compliant" graduate schools, like law schools,
as well as the university itself. See id. at 279-80. The most recent version of the
Solomon Amendment is found at 10 U.S.C.A. ' 983 (West Supp. 2006).
115. AALS (American Association of Law Schools).
116. Nondiscrimination policies of most law schools protect members of any cate-
gory describing national origin, age, color, gender, disability, ethnic group, race, relig-
ion, marital or parental status, or sexual orientation. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
AALS By-Laws at Section 6-4 require member schools to observe a nondiscrimina-
tion policy with respect to employer recruitment, but the organization does permit its
member schools to admit military recruiters as long as the schools take "ameliorative"
measures that might include informing students that the military violates the nondis-
crimination policy but is allowed to recruit because of the over-the-barrel situation
created for the law schools by the Solomon Amendment. See id. at 281.
117. 10 U.S.C. § 654 requires that military personnel be discharged from the armed
forces if it is shown that the member "engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless.., such conduct.., is unlikely
to recur; ... was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation .... Id.
at 281 n.3.
118. See id. at 274-75.
119. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
120. Likelihood of success on the merits; likelihood of irreparable harm without a
preliminary injunction; the harm of denying the injunction outweighs the harm of
granting it; and the injunction would serve the public interest. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp.
2d at 296.
121. See id. at 299-302. 334
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speech and association) claimed by plaintiffs.'22 Under a similar anal-
ysis of the facts, the court dismissed plaintiffs remaining claims.1 23
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed by a vote of 2 to 1. In finding
that FAIR had shown its likelihood of success on the merits, and,
therefore, its entitlement to injunctive relief,124 the Circuit was most
persuaded by FAIR's assertion that the Solomon Amendment vio-
lated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.125 The Circuit was
persuaded by FAIR's assertion because, under the facts of the case, a
benefit by the government (public funding) was being proffered on
the condition that FAIR relinquish constitutional rights.' 26
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, FAIR could es-
tablish its free speech claim either by establishing that its "expressive
association" rights were impaired or by establishing that its free
speech rights were violated by "compelled speech" (because the
Amendment's provisions mandated that law schools engage in "com-
pelled speech" to support military recruiters). If FAIR established its
prima facie case under either free speech venue, then the burden
shifted to the government to show that the Amendment was the least
restrictive means of effecting its program and was narrowly tailored to
serve its compelling government interest-the traditional strict scru-
tiny test.127
The Third Circuit was persuaded that FAIR's constitutionally pro-
tected expressive association rights were impaired by the Solomon
Amendment under both kinds of protected free speech. First, the Cir-
cuit found that FAIR's First Amendment rights were impaired by the
122. See id. at 299-305. Of particular importance, the court found the Amend-
ment's interference did not rise to the level found by the Supreme Court in Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). See id. at 305.
123. The court also ruled that plaintiffs could muster only marginal evidence for its
other claims. In short, plaintiffs failed to meet their prima facie burden. See id. at
315-22.
124. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 390
F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).
125. The test for injunctive relief employed by the Third Circuit was the traditional
three factor test used by the district court: "FAIR must establish (1) a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent the injunction, (3)
that the harm to FAIR absent the injunction outweighs the harm to the Government
of granting it, and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest." Id. at 228 (citing
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (2002)).
126. See id. at 236.
127. "Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Government 'may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."' Id. at 229-30 (quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)) (also citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)) ("public university could not condition funds
for student publications on their secular perspectives"). In FAIR we may have come
full circle, balancing the Rosenberger/Southworth "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine
(premised on the First Amendment free speech rights of the students) with the First
Amendment free speech rights of "the university," with both sets of rights being pro-
tected by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 1
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Solomon Amendment under the Supreme Court's "expressive associ-
ation" doctrine. 128 That doctrine was recently elucidated in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,129 a case in which, ironically, the associa-
tion (Boy Scouts of America) successfully asserted its "expressive as-
sociation" rights to defend itself from a claim that its termination of
an openly gay assistant scout master violated New Jersey's public ac-
commodation law.13 ° In doing so, the Boy Scouts of America had to
clear the hurdles of a three factor test: (1) that it was an "expensive
association" (that is, an association that is premised upon and com-
municates a particular set of ideas or values);' (2) that the govern-
ment action impairs the group's ability "to advocate its viewpoint; 132
and (3) that the government's action cannot survive a strict scrutiny
test.1
33
Both the district court and the Third Circuit had no trouble finding
that law schools are "expressive associations." But their reasoning di-
verged on the second prong of the test. While the district court found
the occasional presence of military recruiters on the law school prem-
ises was minimal and distinguishable from the Dale case (where the
apparent authority of a gay scoutmaster sent a significantly conflicting
message that undermined the Scouts' associational message), 3 the
Third Circuit found Dale analogous. Just as the presence of a gay
scoutmaster sent a message that conflicted with the Scouts' disap-
proval of "homosexual conduct,, 1 35 so the presence of military per-
sonnel, charged with the mission to hire under a policy that
discriminates against gays, puts law schools in the constitutionally un-
tenable position of contradicting their own anti-discrimination val-
128. See id. at 235.
129. Boy Scout of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
130. See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 230-31 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 659).
131. The seminal case that elaborated the current "expressive association" doctrine
was Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984), wherein the court
stated that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amend-
ment [like free speech, is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."
The implied right of association:
[I]s especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from the suppression by the majority. ...
Government actions that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom can
take a number of forms .... [One of which is] intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association . . . [like a] regulation that forces the
group to accept members it does not desire.
Id. Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the group to
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express. See id. at 623.
Thus, "[f]reedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."
Id.
132. See Boy Scout of Am., 530 U.S. at 647-48.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 660.
135. See id.
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ues.' 36 The Third Circuit also disagreed with the district court on the
issue of whether the occasional presence of a conflicting message was
sufficient to rise to the level of an unconstitutional impairment of the
association's rights to express its values. Citing its own 2004 prece-
dent, Circle School v. Pappert,37 where it held that the government
could not compel private schools' students to recite the Pledge of Al-
legiance and sing the National Anthem, the Third Circuit reiterated its
conclusion that "[c]ertainly, the temporal duration of a burden on
First Amendment rights is not determinative of whether there is a
constitutional violation."' 38
Moreover, the Third Circuit took issue with the district court's mea-
sure of when a conflicting message amounted to an impairment of the
association's expression of its own message and values. The Third Cir-
cuit quoted Dale, where the Supreme Court directed that courts must
"give deference to an association's view of what would impair its ex-
pression[,]' 1 39 and then applied that rule to the facts in Dale. The
Supreme Court deferred to the Boy Scouts' view and concluded that
the impairment was substantial.' 40 By contrast, the Third Circuit
pointed out that the district court in Dale and the district court in
FAIR had impermissibly interjected their own conclusions as to
whether the government action amounted to an impairment.
a1 4
Having found that FAIR cleared the first two hurdles of the "ex-
pressive association" test, the Third Circuit turned to the strict scru-
tiny test, acknowledging at the outset that the government's interest in
hiring lawyers for the military was compelling. 142  But it cautioned
that the nature of the interest was not enough. The means employed
by the government to achieve its ends must be "narrowly tailored,"
136. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 390
F.3d 219, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2004).
137. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (2004).
138. See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 232 (quoting Pappert, 381 F.3d at 182 (2004)).
139. Id. -i 233 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
140. See id.
141. See id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 653) (explaining the district court's conclusion
that there was no impairment of the Boy Scouts' message because the policy of the
Scouts was to "'discourag[e] its leaders from disseminating any views on sexual is-
sues[.]'" (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 654) (citation omitted)). The Third Circuit em-
phasized that the requisite difference compelled a finding that, on the second prong of
the "expressive association" doctrine, FAIR was likely to prevail because-like the
Scouts resisting the message that a gay scout master conveys-the military's message
would undermine the association's message because the association said so. See id. at
233-34. The Third Circuit calls our attention to the emphasis the Dale court put on
the association's own view that its message was impaired and how that emphasis dif-
fers from the approach taken in the seminal case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984), and in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Du-
arte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), where the Supreme Court did not defer to the association's
view that its associational rights were impaired. See id. at 233 n.12. Since those semi-
nal cases, however, the Court has regularly deferred to the association's view of what
might impair its message.
142. See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 234, 234 n.14.
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such that there are no alternative means available that would be less
restrictive.143 Finding the government had offered no evidence on the
issue,14 4 the court concluded that the government failed to meet its
burden of showing that the Solomon Amendment process was the
least restrictive means. 145 Conversely, the Third Circuit held that
FAIR met its burden under the "expressive association" test and was
likely to succeed on the merits of that claim.146
Because it is this "expressive association" doctrine that currently
offers the most promising venue for developing a doctrine that would
protect academic freedom and the "university mission" from political
and religious incursions invited by the "viewpoint neutrality" doctrine
(and the nascent "public employee speech" test), our analysis might
stop here. Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court's reversal of the
Third Circuit's decision in FAIR implicates other issues raised at the
district and appellate court levels, and because these issues might also
be raised in future cases challenging academic freedom and the "uni-
versity mission," it might prove instructive to recapitulate the analysis
of those issues as well.
Aside from the "expressive association" doctrine, an association
might also prove its entitlement to constitutional protection under the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine by showing that its speech was
"compelled."' 47 This argument was also successfully raised in an ear-
lier case (Hurley) where, as in Dale, an association argued successfully
that its protected speech of discriminating against gays was infringed
upon by a government nondiscrimination statute. 148 In that case, the
Supreme Court decided that the enforcement of the statute would
compel the association to express a message with which it dis-
agreed.149 In Hurley, as in Dale, the association sought constitutional
protection against inclusion of gays (here, participation of gays explic-
itly marching as gays in a St. Patrick's parade), and the Hurley Court
ruled that enforcement of the state law, in this context, would compel
the parade organizers to accommodate and support gay advocacy.1 50
Hurley's application of the "compelled speech" doctrine is only one
venue for its use. The Supreme Court has identified three venues in
which the doctrine is applicable: (1) where the government compels a
private party to "propagate" a government message;' 5 ' (2) where the
143. See id. at 234-35.
144. Id. at 235.
145. See id. ("The Government has failed to proffer a shred of evidence .....
146. See id.
147. See id. at 229-30.
148. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 566-81 (1995).
149. See id. at 559.
150. See id. at 572-73.
151. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that states cannot
require state mottoes on license plates). 338
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government compels a private party to "accommodate" another pri-
vate party's message;' 5 2 and (3) where the government compels a pri-
vate party to "subsidize" the speech of another that it opposes.
153
FAIR asserted its constitutional rights had been infringed with respect
to all three kinds of compulsion under the doctrine, and the Third
Circuit agreed, reversing the district court on this issue as well. 154 The
district court held that because recruiting was not expressive activity,
but only an "economic" project, FAIR could not be said to have been
compelled to propagate its message. 155 But the Third Circuit found
that "communication of information" was one of the "hallmarks of
First Amendment expression. ,156
Finally, the Third Circuit took issue with the district court's finding
that the Solomon Amendment required law schools to engage in "ex-
pressive conduct," not speech. Having found that FAIR's interest was
more properly cast as "expressive conduct," the district court went on
to apply the requisite intermediate scrutiny test, rather than the strict
scrutiny test, applicable for free speech infringements. Intermediate
scrutiny requires that the government prove its action: (1) is constitu-
tional; (2) furthers an important government interest that is (3) unre-
lated to suppressing speech and its impact on speech is (4) merely
incidental and "no greater than essential" to effect the government
program.157 Under this test, the district court concluded the conduct
required of FAIR was merely incidental and, therefore, passed the in-
termediate scrutiny test.1 58 Again, the Third Circuit took issue with
the district court's analysis and, again, did so by finding Dale (where
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected an "expressive conduct" analy-
sis) analogous.1 59 Moreover, the Third Circuit opined, even under the
intermediate level of scrutiny, that the government failed to meet its
burden of showing that the Solomon Amendment is merely an inci-
dental restriction on FAIR's rights-a restriction that is not greater
than is essential to the furtherance of the government's interest in re-
cruitment.1 60 "[I]nvoking the importance of a well-trained military is
152. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581 (the Court held, "Disapproval of a private
speaker's statement does not legitimize use of the Commonwealth's power to compel
the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others.").
153. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
154. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 390
F.3d 219, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004).
155. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Right, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 291
F. Supp. 2d 269, 307-08 (D.N.J. 2003).
156. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 237-38 (citing Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 275 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (emphasizing that the private party has the right to con-
clude it is being compelled to propagate, endorse, or subsidize speech with which it
disagrees)).
157. See FAIR, id. at 243-45 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
158. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
159. See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 244.
160. See id. at 246.
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not a substitute for demonstrating that there is an important govern-
mental interest in opening the law schools to military recruiting.' '1 61
The Third Circuit concluded: "'[T]he phrase 'war power' cannot be
invoked as a talismanic incantation to ... remove constitutional limi-
tations safeguarding essential liberties.' "162
But it is hard to resist the conclusion that that is precisely what the
Supreme Court did on appeal by reversing the Third Circuit. Further-
more, the special deference to a military engaged in the Bush Admin-
istration's illusive "war on terror" in Iraq was entirely predictable and
consistent with the stance taken by the judiciary in the past. As the
dissenting judge in the Third Circuit case said, "[I]n the entire history
of the United States, no court heretofore has ever declared unconsti-
tutional on First Amendment grounds any congressional statute spe-
cifically designed to support the military. ''13 With that history as
prologue, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "'judicial deference
... is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to
raise and support armies[,] '' 164 and found the district court's analysis
persuasive. In sum, the Supreme Court decided that: (1) Congress has
the constitutional authority to impose a military recruitment access
policy on law schools; 16 5 (2) in any case, the Solomon Amendment
regulates conduct, not speech;166 (3) therefore the immediate level
scrutiny test applied in O'Brien is the appropriate test;167and (4) that
test requires only that "'an incidental burden on speech is no greater
than is essential,... so long as the neutral regulation promotes a sub-
stantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation."' 168 Applying that rendition of the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test, without requiring any evidentiary showing by the
government that other, less restrictive means were unavailable, the
Court found the Solomon Amendment passed constitutional mus-
ter.1 69 Deference, indeed.
161. Id. at 245.
162. Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 89 (1981)).
163. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 247 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert emphasizes the
fact-driven nature of the case, which implicates not only Congress' constitutional
power under the Spending Clause, but also its obligations under the Constitution "to
support the military." See id. at 247-50.
164. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 126 S.
Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
165. See Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
166. See id. at 1310-11.
167. See id. at 1311.
168. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
169. See Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1311. The Court argued, on behalf of the govern-
ment, that "[m]ilitary recruiting promotes the substantial Government interest in rais-
ing and supporting the Armed Forces-an objective that would be achieved less
effectively if the military were forced to recruit on less favorable terms than other
employers." Id. This is a somewhat disingenuous statement given the gravamen of
FAIR's claim that it simply wanted to hold the government to the same anti-discrimi-
nation policy imposed on other prospective employers. See id. at 1305 (taking is4i
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The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR (finding that under the "ex-
pressive association" test, any infringements on the law schools' free
speech rights were minimal and temporary) distinguished Dale from
FAIR. But, for purposes of this article's thesis, it is also critical to add
that, like the Boy Scouts of America in Dale, this Supreme Court did
recognize FAIR as an "expressive association" entitled to First
Amendment protections under the "expressive association" doc-
trine.' The decision clearly rests on three factors: (1) the deference
historically afforded legislation in support of the military; (2) the tem-
porary and non-curricular presence of military recruiters on law
school premises; (3) and the Court's conclusion that accommodation
of military recruitment affected a law school's conduct but not its as-
sociational rights of free speech. Further, the Court's conclusions
about the second and third factors were, arguably, influenced by the
weight of the first factors. When the special deference the facts of
FAIR commanded is eliminated from the Court's analysis, what re-
mains is a strong foundation for doctrinal protection of academic free-
dom and the "university mission." '171
First, FAIR established that universities have First Amendment
rights of "expressive association." Second, those rights protect
FAIR's expressive mission. In the case of most colleges and universi-
ties, public and private, that mission is to expand knowledge and un-
derstanding through a system of free inquiry and dialogic negotiations
and debate that rely on arguments premised upon empiricism and log-
ical argument. That is to say, a system premised upon "academic free-
dom." Third, incursions, in the form of government regulation, or
private individuals and groups that seek to impair these associational
rights, can succeed only if they meet the difficult requirements of the
strict scrutiny test.
Thus, the associational rights for colleges and universities estab-
lished in FAIR may serve to develop a doctrinal counterpoise to check
with the notion, assented by amici, that all that is required under Solomon is even-
handed application of the anti-discrimination policy). Finally, the Court simply dele-
gated the finding of less restrictive means to the government itself: "The issue is not
whether other means of raising an army and providing for a navy might be ade-
quate .... That is a judgment for Congress, not for the courts." Id. at 1311.
170. See id. at 1311-12.
171. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, put it this way:
In Dale, we held that the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association was
violated by New Jersey's public accommodations law, which required the
organization to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster .... The Solomon
Amendment, however, does not affect a law school's associational rights....
Law schools... "associate" with military recruiters in the sense that they
interact with them. But recruiters are not part of the law school. Recruiters
are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose
of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's expressive
association.
Id. at 1312 (emphasis added).
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the Religious (and political) Rights groups' attempts to foreclose open
discourse in higher education. Furthermore, when following FAIR, it
is clear that associational rights to include (nondiscrimination policies
in FAIR) are entitled to the same legal protection as associational
rights to exclude (discriminatory policies in Dale and in Hurley). This
evolution of the modern associational rights doctrine must surely re-
mind us of the enduring commitment of a system of justice premised
upon the rule of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
What goes around, comes around. Since the 13th Century, institu-
tions of law and higher learning have appeared to be mutually rein-
forcing in their quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality. But recent
assaults on the "university mission" of free inquiry and academic free-
dom have called our attention to the absence of any judicial doctrine
protecting the "university mission" and academic freedom. The Su-
preme Court has been solicitous of Religious Right students seeking
to exclude views that offend them. It has crafted for them a "view-
point neutrality" test under Rosenberger and Southworth that is so in-
determinate that it presents a real threat to the "university mission"
and academic freedom. The recent case of Garcetti, holding that pub-
lic employees have no First Amendment rights when they speak pur-
suant to their public duties, appears to compound the problem and
vitiate academic freedom in public universities. There is no counter-
vailing doctrine to protect the core values of most public and private
universities. Ironically, two Supreme Court cases, Dale and Hurley
(where an organization's right to exclude prevailed under the Court's
evolving "expressive association" doctrine), may offer the best doctri-
nal hope for the "university mission's" goal of inclusion and open in-
quiry. While FAIR's attempt to employ the doctrine to protect its
anti-discrimination policy failed, there is reason to believe that the
strength of the Court's traditional deference to legislation in support
of the military, rather than any weakness in the law school's associa-
tion rights, must explain the result in FAIR. Thus, FAIR should be
remembered as an important case for developing a long-overdue doc-
trine to protect the "university mission" and academic freedom. The
next step in the process is to establish that the "viewpoint neutrality"
doctrine cannot be used to infringe upon the university's "expressive
association" rights.
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